You all have heard the news, do doubt. Oil prices on the stock market went crazy for a while. Maybe Iran said that because a week ago it was announced that a new pipeline which bypasses the strait of Hormuz is set to open "soon".
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/uae-sa...101351355.html
Only 2.5 MB of the 20 Million Barrels per day the USA consumes passes through Hormuz. About 10%.
The CSIS published a study four years ago concerning the possibility of Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz. Here is the gist of it:
One wonders of they are trying to take advantage of Pres. Obama's vacillation in his Iran policy by stirring up the waters.
It may backfire on Iran if Israel feels this threat would destabilize the Mid-East to the extent that Israel would have nothing to lose with a pre-emptive strike on Iran's nuclear and military capacity ... perhaps using nukes.
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/uae-sa...101351355.html
DOHA, Qatar (AP) -- The oil minister of the United Arab Emirates says a new crude oil pipeline that will bypass the strategically sensitive Strait of Hormuz is almost finished.
Mohammed bin Dhaen al-Hamli made the comments on Monday. He spoke to reporters on the sidelines of an oil industry meeting in the Qatari capital Doha.
He declined to say when the pipeline would open, though his comments suggest it could become operational soon.
The Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline project aims to ship crude from the UAE's main oil producing region to the port of Fujairah on the country's Gulf of Oman coast.
That would allow some of the OPEC member's oil to avoid the Strait of Hormuz, access to which is shared by Iran and Oman.
Mohammed bin Dhaen al-Hamli made the comments on Monday. He spoke to reporters on the sidelines of an oil industry meeting in the Qatari capital Doha.
He declined to say when the pipeline would open, though his comments suggest it could become operational soon.
The Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline project aims to ship crude from the UAE's main oil producing region to the port of Fujairah on the country's Gulf of Oman coast.
That would allow some of the OPEC member's oil to avoid the Strait of Hormuz, access to which is shared by Iran and Oman.
The CSIS published a study four years ago concerning the possibility of Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz. Here is the gist of it:
The Iranian Threat in the Gulf
Iran has built up a large mix of unconventional forces in the Gulf that can challenge its neighbors in a wide variety of asymmetric wars, including low-level wars of attrition. These include a wide range of elements in the regular forces and IRGC as well as some elements in the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), or Vezarat-e Ettela’ at va Aminat-e Keshvar (VEVAK), which was installed following the revolution to replace the now-disbanded National Organization for Intelligence and Security (SAVAK). In 2006, the MOIS employed about 15,000 civilian staff. Its major tasks included intelligence collection and operations in the Middle East and Central Asia as well as domestic intelligence and monitoring of clerical and government officials, as well as work on preventing conspiracies against the Islamic Republic.
Its air forces remain vulnerable in any form of mission, but are less vulnerable near Iranian bases, sensor coverage, and SAM coverage. Its naval forces include its three Kilo-class submarines, which can harass or seek to interdict ships moving in an out of the Gulf, a wide range of mines and vessels that can be used as mine layers or to release free floating mines.
They also include roughly 140 light patrol and coastal combatants, including 11 French designed Kaman-class missile patrol boats with 2-4 CSS-N-4/YJ-1/ “Sardine” anti-ship missiles each. These are sea skimming, solid fueled missiles with a 42 to 50-kilometer range, 165 kilogram warheads, INS and active radar similar to the Exocet, and can be used to harass civil shipping and tankers, and offshore facilities, as well as attack naval vessels. Iran may well have far more advanced Russian and Chinese-supplied missiles as well and claims to be developing advanced anti-ship and anti-fixed target missiles of its own.
Iran made claims in the spring of 2006 that it was testing more advanced weapons for such forces. These included a sonar-evading anti-ship missile that can be fired from submarines as well as surface combatants that IRGC Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi claimed no enemy warship could detect, and “no warship could escape because of its high velocity.”
Iran also claimed to be testing a new missile called the Kowsar with a very large warhead and extremely high speed to attack “big ships and submarines” that it claimed could evade radar and antimissile missiles. While such tests may have been real, Iran has made so many grossly exaggerated claims about its weapons developments in the past, that it seems they were designed more to try to deter U.S. military action and/or reassure the Iranian public than truly being serious real world capabilities. It followed these actions up in the late summer of 2006 by testing new submarine launched anti-ship missiles.
It has a 20,000 man naval branch in the IRGC that includes some 5,000 marines. This branch of the IRGC has 10 Houdong missile patrol boasts with CSS-N-8/C-802/YJ-2 missiles with 165 kilogram warheads, active and inertial guidance, and maximum ranges of 120 kilometers. It operates mobile land-based CSS-C-3/HY-2/Sea Eagle/Seersucker anti-ship missiles that can be rapidly emplaced on the Iranian coast or islands in the Gulf shipping channel. These systems have ranges of 95-100 kilometers, very large warheads, and autocontrol and radar homing guidance. They can be targeted by a remote air link,and the exact level of upgrading of these missiles since their initial delivery during the Iran-Iraq War is unknown.
The IRGC has large numbers of Boghammar and other patrol boats are with recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, manportable surface-to-air missiles, and anti-armor guided weapons. The IRGC routinely uses small civilian ships and vessels in unconventional operations in various exercises, including mine laying and raids on offshore facilities. This force has facilities at Bandar-e-Abbas, Khorramshar, and on the islands of Larak, Abu Musa, Al Farsiyah, Sirrir and the Halul oil platform. It can make use of additional facilities at Iran’s main naval bases at Bander e-abbas, Bushehr, Kharg Island, Bandar e-Anzelli, Bandar e-Khomeini, Bandar e-Mahshahr, and Chah Bahar. These forces can rapidly disperse, and shelter in caves and hardened sites. Small ships can be very hard to detect with most radars even in a normal sea state, and civilian ships can easily change flags and meld in with commercial traffic.
According to one Israeli source, Iran plans to defeat the United States by attrition, trying to exploit perceived American psychological vulnerabilities for a high number of casualties. Further, the report states: “Iran’s military acquisitions reveal a rather defensive mindset with an intention to deter against an attack rather than to win a war by overwhelming force.
“Closing the Gulf?”
These light naval forces have special importance because of their potential ability to threaten oil and shipping traffic in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, raid key offshore facilities, and conduct raids on targets on the Gulf coast. Many Gulf energy facilities are extremely vulnerable, and the GCC states are extremely vulnerable to any form of attack on their desalination and coastal power facilities, and precision strikes on critical high-capacity, long-lead time replacement items in energy facilities and power grids. This vulnerability might also allow Iran to carry out very successful air attacks in a surprise raid with precision weapons, using IRGC “suicide” aircraft, and future UAVs and precision cruise missiles. It is also possible that Iran could conduct coastal raids with IRGC and/or Special Forces that went deeper into Southern Gulf territory.
Iran could not “close the Gulf” for more than a few days to two weeks even if it was willing to sacrifice all of these assets, suffer massive retaliation, and potentially lose many of its own oil facilities and export revenues. Its chronic economic mismanagement has made it extremely dependent on a few refineries, product imports, and food imports.
It would almost certainly lose far more than it gained from such a “war,” but nations often fail to act as rational bargainers in a crisis, particularly if attacked or if their regimes are threatened.
Even sporadic, low-level attacks on Gulf shipping and facilities, however, could allow Iran to wage a war of intimidation in an effort to pressure its neighbors. As Figure Two, which is based on a recent International Energy Agency study shows, the current and future volume of oil export traffic through the Gulf is steadily increasing and presents a target with global strategic importance that will grow steadily in coming years even if one exempts growing the growth in tanker shipments of LPG. This will make any threat that sharply raises oil prices, deters smooth tanker flows and deliveries, and otherwise interfers with energy exports of great importance, particularly in a world where every developed economy is critically dependent on global trade and the continuing flow of Asian heavy manufactures that are steadily more dependent on Gulf oil.
It should be noted, however, that Iran is acutely dependent on oil revenues, and that attacks on its refineries and power plants could do immense retaliatory damage. In mid-September of 2006, reports also surfaced that the U.S. navy was reconsidering older plans for blocking two Iranian oil ports near the Straits of Hormuz. This apparently was accompanied by a “prepare-to-deploy” order for several mine-warfare vessels. In February 2007, a second aircraft-carrier group was deployed to the Persian Gulf, and reportedly plans to send a third one were considered.6 Iran is also as vulnerable to attacks on its oil platforms and loading facilities in the Gulf as the Southern Gulf states.
Iran has built up a large mix of unconventional forces in the Gulf that can challenge its neighbors in a wide variety of asymmetric wars, including low-level wars of attrition. These include a wide range of elements in the regular forces and IRGC as well as some elements in the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), or Vezarat-e Ettela’ at va Aminat-e Keshvar (VEVAK), which was installed following the revolution to replace the now-disbanded National Organization for Intelligence and Security (SAVAK). In 2006, the MOIS employed about 15,000 civilian staff. Its major tasks included intelligence collection and operations in the Middle East and Central Asia as well as domestic intelligence and monitoring of clerical and government officials, as well as work on preventing conspiracies against the Islamic Republic.
Its air forces remain vulnerable in any form of mission, but are less vulnerable near Iranian bases, sensor coverage, and SAM coverage. Its naval forces include its three Kilo-class submarines, which can harass or seek to interdict ships moving in an out of the Gulf, a wide range of mines and vessels that can be used as mine layers or to release free floating mines.
They also include roughly 140 light patrol and coastal combatants, including 11 French designed Kaman-class missile patrol boats with 2-4 CSS-N-4/YJ-1/ “Sardine” anti-ship missiles each. These are sea skimming, solid fueled missiles with a 42 to 50-kilometer range, 165 kilogram warheads, INS and active radar similar to the Exocet, and can be used to harass civil shipping and tankers, and offshore facilities, as well as attack naval vessels. Iran may well have far more advanced Russian and Chinese-supplied missiles as well and claims to be developing advanced anti-ship and anti-fixed target missiles of its own.
Iran made claims in the spring of 2006 that it was testing more advanced weapons for such forces. These included a sonar-evading anti-ship missile that can be fired from submarines as well as surface combatants that IRGC Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi claimed no enemy warship could detect, and “no warship could escape because of its high velocity.”
Iran also claimed to be testing a new missile called the Kowsar with a very large warhead and extremely high speed to attack “big ships and submarines” that it claimed could evade radar and antimissile missiles. While such tests may have been real, Iran has made so many grossly exaggerated claims about its weapons developments in the past, that it seems they were designed more to try to deter U.S. military action and/or reassure the Iranian public than truly being serious real world capabilities. It followed these actions up in the late summer of 2006 by testing new submarine launched anti-ship missiles.
It has a 20,000 man naval branch in the IRGC that includes some 5,000 marines. This branch of the IRGC has 10 Houdong missile patrol boasts with CSS-N-8/C-802/YJ-2 missiles with 165 kilogram warheads, active and inertial guidance, and maximum ranges of 120 kilometers. It operates mobile land-based CSS-C-3/HY-2/Sea Eagle/Seersucker anti-ship missiles that can be rapidly emplaced on the Iranian coast or islands in the Gulf shipping channel. These systems have ranges of 95-100 kilometers, very large warheads, and autocontrol and radar homing guidance. They can be targeted by a remote air link,and the exact level of upgrading of these missiles since their initial delivery during the Iran-Iraq War is unknown.
The IRGC has large numbers of Boghammar and other patrol boats are with recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, manportable surface-to-air missiles, and anti-armor guided weapons. The IRGC routinely uses small civilian ships and vessels in unconventional operations in various exercises, including mine laying and raids on offshore facilities. This force has facilities at Bandar-e-Abbas, Khorramshar, and on the islands of Larak, Abu Musa, Al Farsiyah, Sirrir and the Halul oil platform. It can make use of additional facilities at Iran’s main naval bases at Bander e-abbas, Bushehr, Kharg Island, Bandar e-Anzelli, Bandar e-Khomeini, Bandar e-Mahshahr, and Chah Bahar. These forces can rapidly disperse, and shelter in caves and hardened sites. Small ships can be very hard to detect with most radars even in a normal sea state, and civilian ships can easily change flags and meld in with commercial traffic.
According to one Israeli source, Iran plans to defeat the United States by attrition, trying to exploit perceived American psychological vulnerabilities for a high number of casualties. Further, the report states: “Iran’s military acquisitions reveal a rather defensive mindset with an intention to deter against an attack rather than to win a war by overwhelming force.
“Closing the Gulf?”
These light naval forces have special importance because of their potential ability to threaten oil and shipping traffic in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, raid key offshore facilities, and conduct raids on targets on the Gulf coast. Many Gulf energy facilities are extremely vulnerable, and the GCC states are extremely vulnerable to any form of attack on their desalination and coastal power facilities, and precision strikes on critical high-capacity, long-lead time replacement items in energy facilities and power grids. This vulnerability might also allow Iran to carry out very successful air attacks in a surprise raid with precision weapons, using IRGC “suicide” aircraft, and future UAVs and precision cruise missiles. It is also possible that Iran could conduct coastal raids with IRGC and/or Special Forces that went deeper into Southern Gulf territory.
Iran could not “close the Gulf” for more than a few days to two weeks even if it was willing to sacrifice all of these assets, suffer massive retaliation, and potentially lose many of its own oil facilities and export revenues. Its chronic economic mismanagement has made it extremely dependent on a few refineries, product imports, and food imports.
It would almost certainly lose far more than it gained from such a “war,” but nations often fail to act as rational bargainers in a crisis, particularly if attacked or if their regimes are threatened.
Even sporadic, low-level attacks on Gulf shipping and facilities, however, could allow Iran to wage a war of intimidation in an effort to pressure its neighbors. As Figure Two, which is based on a recent International Energy Agency study shows, the current and future volume of oil export traffic through the Gulf is steadily increasing and presents a target with global strategic importance that will grow steadily in coming years even if one exempts growing the growth in tanker shipments of LPG. This will make any threat that sharply raises oil prices, deters smooth tanker flows and deliveries, and otherwise interfers with energy exports of great importance, particularly in a world where every developed economy is critically dependent on global trade and the continuing flow of Asian heavy manufactures that are steadily more dependent on Gulf oil.
It should be noted, however, that Iran is acutely dependent on oil revenues, and that attacks on its refineries and power plants could do immense retaliatory damage. In mid-September of 2006, reports also surfaced that the U.S. navy was reconsidering older plans for blocking two Iranian oil ports near the Straits of Hormuz. This apparently was accompanied by a “prepare-to-deploy” order for several mine-warfare vessels. In February 2007, a second aircraft-carrier group was deployed to the Persian Gulf, and reportedly plans to send a third one were considered.6 Iran is also as vulnerable to attacks on its oil platforms and loading facilities in the Gulf as the Southern Gulf states.
It may backfire on Iran if Israel feels this threat would destabilize the Mid-East to the extent that Israel would have nothing to lose with a pre-emptive strike on Iran's nuclear and military capacity ... perhaps using nukes.
is how many times it has been portrayed in film and literature, the most notorious of which are a couple of the Bond films.
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