The break-in is described here.
This event was a manual attack through the server "Hera" via compromised credentials, during which "It *appears* that 3.1-rc2 might have blocked the exploit injector". The attack modified the sshd/package and restarted it, which would be a first step to open a back door into every site that installed ssh. A Trojan script was also added to the startup scripts but it also appears that the hack was interrupted in mid-event because the hacker never got the opportunity to clean up the logs and remove evidence of his/her break-in.
I post the entire notice here:
As the text highlighted in red points out, it would be impossible to modify the history of any file on each of the hundreds of local development hard drives that contain them. Either someone on Hera was using a weak password, or they trusted the wrong person.
This event was a manual attack through the server "Hera" via compromised credentials, during which "It *appears* that 3.1-rc2 might have blocked the exploit injector". The attack modified the sshd/package and restarted it, which would be a first step to open a back door into every site that installed ssh. A Trojan script was also added to the startup scripts but it also appears that the hack was interrupted in mid-event because the hacker never got the opportunity to clean up the logs and remove evidence of his/her break-in.
I post the entire notice here:
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Security breach on kernel.org
Earlier this month, a number of servers in the kernel.org infrastructure were compromised. We discovered this August 28th. While we currently believe that the source code repositories were unaffected, we are in the process of verifying this and taking steps to enhance security across the kernel.org infrastructure.
What happened?
* Intruders gained root access on the server Hera. We believe they may have gained this access via a compromised user credential; how they managed to exploit that to root access is currently unknown and is being investigated.
* Files belonging to ssh (openssh, openssh-server and openssh-clients) were modified and running live.
* A trojan startup file was added to the system start up scripts
* User interactions were logged, as well as some exploit code. We have retained this for now.
* Trojan initially discovered due to the Xnest /dev/mem error message w/o Xnest installed; have been seen on other systems. It is unclear if systems that exhibit this message are susceptible, compromised or not. If developers see this, and you don't have Xnest installed, please investigate.
* It *appears* that 3.1-rc2 might have blocked the exploit injector, we don't know if this is intentional or a side affect of another bugfix or change.
What Has Been Done so far:
* We have currently taken boxes off line to do a backup and are in the process of doing complete reinstalls.
* We have notified authorities in the United States and in Europe to assist with the investigation
* We will be doing a full reinstall on all boxes on kernel.org
* We are in the process of doing an analysis on the code within git, and the tarballs to confirm that nothing has been modified
The Linux community and kernel.org take the security of the kernel.org domain extremely seriously, and are pursuing all avenues to investigate this attack and prevent future ones.
However, it's also useful to note that the potential damage of cracking kernel.org is far less than typical software repositories. That's because kernel development takes place using the git distributed revision control system, designed by Linus Torvalds. For each of the nearly 40,000 files in the Linux kernel, a cryptographically secure SHA-1 hash is calculated to uniquely define the exact contents of that file. Git is designed so that the name of each version of the kernel depends upon the complete development history leading up to that version. Once it is published, it is not possible to change the old versions without it being noticed.
Those files and the corresponding hashes exist not just on the kernel.org machine and its mirrors, but on the hard drives of each several thousand kernel developers, distribution maintainers, and other users of kernel.org. Any tampering with any file in the kernel.org repository would immediately be noticed by each developer as they updated their personal repository, which most do daily.
We are currently working with the 448 users of kernel.org to change their credentials and change their SSH keys.
We are also currently auditing all security policies to make kernel.org more secure, but are confident that our systems, specifically git, have excellent design to prevent real damage from these types of attacks.
Security breach on kernel.org
Earlier this month, a number of servers in the kernel.org infrastructure were compromised. We discovered this August 28th. While we currently believe that the source code repositories were unaffected, we are in the process of verifying this and taking steps to enhance security across the kernel.org infrastructure.
What happened?
* Intruders gained root access on the server Hera. We believe they may have gained this access via a compromised user credential; how they managed to exploit that to root access is currently unknown and is being investigated.
* Files belonging to ssh (openssh, openssh-server and openssh-clients) were modified and running live.
* A trojan startup file was added to the system start up scripts
* User interactions were logged, as well as some exploit code. We have retained this for now.
* Trojan initially discovered due to the Xnest /dev/mem error message w/o Xnest installed; have been seen on other systems. It is unclear if systems that exhibit this message are susceptible, compromised or not. If developers see this, and you don't have Xnest installed, please investigate.
* It *appears* that 3.1-rc2 might have blocked the exploit injector, we don't know if this is intentional or a side affect of another bugfix or change.
What Has Been Done so far:
* We have currently taken boxes off line to do a backup and are in the process of doing complete reinstalls.
* We have notified authorities in the United States and in Europe to assist with the investigation
* We will be doing a full reinstall on all boxes on kernel.org
* We are in the process of doing an analysis on the code within git, and the tarballs to confirm that nothing has been modified
The Linux community and kernel.org take the security of the kernel.org domain extremely seriously, and are pursuing all avenues to investigate this attack and prevent future ones.
However, it's also useful to note that the potential damage of cracking kernel.org is far less than typical software repositories. That's because kernel development takes place using the git distributed revision control system, designed by Linus Torvalds. For each of the nearly 40,000 files in the Linux kernel, a cryptographically secure SHA-1 hash is calculated to uniquely define the exact contents of that file. Git is designed so that the name of each version of the kernel depends upon the complete development history leading up to that version. Once it is published, it is not possible to change the old versions without it being noticed.
Those files and the corresponding hashes exist not just on the kernel.org machine and its mirrors, but on the hard drives of each several thousand kernel developers, distribution maintainers, and other users of kernel.org. Any tampering with any file in the kernel.org repository would immediately be noticed by each developer as they updated their personal repository, which most do daily.
We are currently working with the 448 users of kernel.org to change their credentials and change their SSH keys.
We are also currently auditing all security policies to make kernel.org more secure, but are confident that our systems, specifically git, have excellent design to prevent real damage from these types of attacks.
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